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 Uncertainty presides over the future of 
cross-border trade on the island of Ireland in 
the wake of the quickly approaching March 
2019 Brexit date. At the time of writing this 
article, the UK is committed to leaving the 
customs union and single market of the EU, 
thereby forcibly erecting a customs border 
that will need to be managed in the future. 
A focused examination of the UK’s proposed 
resolutions for the Irish border post-Brexit 
provides clarity into the future of cross-border 
trade and its economic impacts. 
 Spanning the province of Ulster, the 
border between Northern Ireland (NI) and 
the Republic of Ireland (ROI) divides rivers, 
bridges, towns, and even the occasional 
farmhouse. Despite a troublesome and violent 
history, the 310-mile frontier today is nearly 
invisible. One of the only detectable differences 
during a crossing is the change in speed limit 
signs from metric units in the south to imperial 
units in the north. Each month, roughly 
385,000 trucks and vans and 1,850,000 cars 
cross that border. Additionally, around 35,000 
people cross daily because they live and work 
on opposite sides. One particular east-west 
road between the towns of Clones and Cavan 
traverses the border four times within six 
miles. Unravelling ties as tightly intertwined as 
these amplifies the challenges Brexit presents 
for the border (McCann and McSorley).
 In this article I first lay out the history of 
the border and then explore the border’s role 
at the center of Brexit negotiations and the 
British position on the border’s future status. 
I then focus on economic aspects, complete 
with a snapshot of current trade between NI 
and the ROI. Finally, I critically analyze, derive 
the economic impacts of, and develop points 
for consideration on the proposed solutions 
from the UK government for the Irish border 
post-Brexit. Shifting away from a frictionless 
free trade border will have heavy consequences 
at the local island level on the two integrated 
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economies. Through highlighting the key 
pitfalls of the UK’s imaginative plans, it is 
evident that nothing can compare to openness 
and cooperation in driving seamless trade 
relations. 
History of the Irish Border 
Partition
 As a result of the Irish War of 
Independence, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was 
signed in 1921. It established the Irish Free 
State while partitioning 6 of the 9 counties 
of Ulster in the majority Protestant and 
pro-British northern region of the island. 
This northern territory, just one-sixth of 
the landmass of the island, became NI and 
remained a member of the UK. The partitioning 
kept majority Protestant unionist counties 
within NI, while majority Catholic nationalist 
counties became part of the Irish Free State 
(later becoming the Republic of Ireland in 
1949). Despite establishing independence, Dr. 
Katy Hayward, a sociology researcher from 
Queen’s University Belfast who specializes in 
studying international borders, describes how 
the new Irish border was drawn with British 
contempt:
  The colonial high-handedness with 
which the border was carved is reflected 
in its route, which cuts through 
single farm holdings and shows little 
respect for the natural terrain of the 
landscape. For the largely rural and 
impoverished borderlands, there were 
particularly dire consequences from 
severing the close social, economic 
and kinship ties that ran across what 
had previously been merely a county 
boundary.
 The Common Travel Area was created in 
1923, shortly after partition, to allow citizens 
of the Irish Free State, NI, and mainland 
Britain to travel throughout and between 
the island nations without identification or 
documentation. This significantly eased the 
burden of separation on people living on either 
side. In its early stages, the border’s customs 
checkpoints managed a limited variety of basic 
goods, including some manufactured products. 
A short decade later, the border played a pivotal 
role in a disruptive trade war (Hayward).
Anglo-Irish Trade War
 In the early years after partition, the 
Irish Free State and the UK (including NI) 
were closely tied through trade. The Irish 
Free State was greatly dependent on UK coal 
coming across the Irish Sea while nearly 
90% of all agricultural products, the largest 
sector of the Irish economy, was exported to 
the UK. After a series of financial disputes in 
1932, the UK instituted a hefty 20% import 
duty on all goods coming from Ireland as 
well as quotas on Irish livestock. Retaliating, 
the Irish Free State imposed import duties 
on coal, steel, iron, cement, electrical goods, 
machinery, and other top British exports (“The 
Economic War…”). This period offers insight 
into an uncertain future where import duties 
and trade boundaries may be established once 
again. 
 After 6 years of this economic tug of 
war, known as the Anglo-Irish Trade War, 
severe impacts rippled across these nations, 
underpinned at the same time by the global 
economic depression. The biggest scars were 
left on the island of Ireland. The economy of 
the Irish Free State nearly collapsed with its 
economic lifeblood, the cattle industry, down 
35% in exports and many farmers going 
bankrupt. Unemployment rose over 475% 
from 1931 to 1935 while, simultaneously, Irish 
emigration increased to more economically 
sustainable shores, including Australia, 
Canada, the United States, and England. 
The overall cost to the Irish Free State from 
the trade war was about £48,000,000, an 
amount worth roughly £3 billion today (“The 
Economic War…”). NI, a region dependent 
on cross-border trade, struggled to find new 
markets, and many industries were hit hard 
by the duties imposed at the border. Mainland 
Britain suffered least in comparison but still 
lost 22% in its share of the Irish Free State 
market and faced shortages of agriculture 
products traditionally acquired from the Irish 
Free State. A treaty ended the trade war in 
1938, although the adverse effects echoed in 
the region much longer. One lasting impact, 
smuggling, has become an integral part of 
Irish culture (“The Economic War…”).
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A Culture of Smuggling
 Smuggling became a day-to-day 
opportunity not just for organized crime 
groups funding violent activities but also for 
families to make ends meet and avoid the 
effects of duties and fines on small family 
budgets. This phenomenon was amplified in 
the borderlands, where even children were sent 
off by their parents to smuggle butter, bacon, 
bread, or eggs across the border (“Living 
with...”). Duties on products coming from one 
side meant cheaper prices on the other, and 
smuggling itself became an accepted norm, 
carrying with it an air of rebellious glamor and 
humanitarian vindication, where the culture 
welcomed innovative methods of subverting 
the border (O’Leary).
 Smuggling significantly waned after the 
joint accession of the UK and the ROI to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1973. This established access into the EEC 
customs union and standardized policies 
and tariffs on goods, which greatly reduced 
trade barriers and furthered the openness of 
border relations. Looking forward, a post-
Brexit withdrawal from the customs union 
and a potential return to a hardened border, 
including tariffs and customs checkpoints, 
could bring criminal and cultural smuggling 
back to the forefront (Hayward).
The Irish Troubles Through 
Current Day 
 Despite the progressive step of joining 
the EEC, the NI-ROI relationship frayed in 
the bloodshed of the Troubles between the 
unionists and nationalists. The 30-year conflict 
was sparked by rioting, political unrest, and 
intermittent violence. A cease-fire was finally 
announced in 1994, ultimately ending with the 
Good Friday Agreement, signed in 1998. The 
peace process, along with newly established 
north-south cooperation programs, facilitated 
all-island prosperity and an integration of the 
cross-border economies while simultaneously 
erasing obstacles and burdens to trade 
(Dorney). During the Troubles, there were only 
17 approved border crossing points. Hundreds 
remained completely closed. As peace 
progressed and the roads were un-blocked, 
businesses began cooperating across the 
border and trade become more fluid (McCann 
and McSorley).
 A Guardian journalist, Sean O’Hagan, 
journeyed in Spring 2017 along the Irish 
border, documenting the sentiment of the 
people living in the borderlands on issues of the 
border post-Brexit. His discoveries exemplify 
the threat a hardened border would have on 
the foundations of peace gained through the 
Good Friday Agreement:
  If one were to imagine a worst-case 
post-Brexit scenario for Northern 
Ireland, it would involve the border 
becoming once again a focus for 
paramilitary aggression. Dissident 
republican groups remain sporadically 
active in Northern Ireland. They are 
relatively few and have little support 
among the nationalist population of 
the north of Ireland, but it is worth 
remembering that the Provisional 
IRA occupied a similar position on the 
margins at the start of the Troubles.
 O’Hagan’s travels unearthed a heavy 
sentiment against a return to the border posts 
of the past. There is a lot at stake. Thanks 
to the combined effects of the Good Friday 
Agreement and membership in the EU for 
both the UK and the ROI, cross-border trade is 
seamless and the frictions of customs, tariffs, 
and quotas nonexistent. The economies and 
people on both sides have benefited from this 
open, peaceful relationship for over a decade 
now. Unfortunately, with Brexit, history could 
well repeat itself. Given the negotiation’s 
uncertainty, it is important to reflect on the 
history of violence and economic disparity 
that has burdened its existence over the past 
century. The after-effects of the Irish War of 
Independence—the Anglo-Irish trade war, 
the culture of smuggling, and most recently 
the violence of the Troubles—suggest there 
is much to be gained in resolving the border 
without rekindling those drastic downsides. 
Brexit and the Border 
Definitions of Terms 
 In analyzing proposed border solutions, 
it is helpful to clarify terms that dictate the 
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Irish border from an economic perspective, 
including a free trade area, the single market, 
and the customs union. A free trade area is 
one in which there are no tariffs, quotas, or 
taxes on goods and services transferred from 
one country to another. Negotiating such 
free trade agreements can take a long time, 
and there are often exceptions, such as for 
agri-food products. The single market, a tenet 
of membership in the EU, is essentially an 
extension of a free trade area, with additional 
rules for free movement of goods, services, 
capital, and people between all the member 
nations. The customs union, also a tenet of EU 
membership, treats all EU member states as a 
single bloc in trade agreements with outside 
nations. All member states agree to offer the 
same tariffs on incoming goods from countries 
outside the EU, meaning that EU members 
cannot strike trade deals with outside nations 
on their own. Once foreign products enter 
any EU nation, they can then be transferred 
throughout the EU with no further frictions or 
barriers (Bloom). 
 Britain will, in leaving the single market 
and customs union, gain sovereignty over 
forging trade agreements with other nations, 
determination of its own product and service 
regulations and standards, and managing 
immigration and other flows across its borders. 
Despite these benefits, there are serious risks 
and concerns that the economic damage for 
Britain will far outweigh the benefits (Bloom).
The British Position
 In her manifesto released before the June 
2017 general election, UK Prime Minister 
Theresa May stated her full intention to lead 
the UK out of the customs union and the single 
market: “As we leave the European Union, we 
will no longer be members of the single market 
or customs union but we will seek a deep and 
special partnership including a comprehensive 
free trade and customs agreement” (Osborne). 
Later, in the same manifesto, May stated one of 
the pinnacle goals is to maintain a frictionless 
and economically fluid border on the island 
of Ireland. These principles were affirmed 
in the joint agreement issued December 8, 
2017, resulting from the first phase of Brexit 
negotiations. However, these aims differ at 
their very core. Brigid Laffan, Director of the 
Global Governance Program at the European 
University Institute, puts it this way: “The 
sentiment in Ireland is that the decision to 
opt for a Brexit model that involves leaving 
both the single market and customs union 
undermines the credibility of the UK’s stated 
commitment to no hard border on the island 
of Ireland, and to frictionless trade” (Laffan). If 
the UK does not secure access to the EU single 
market and customs union, thereby forcibly 
erecting barriers in the form of tariffs and 
customs controls, trade relations between the 
UK and the EU, more specifically NI and the 
ROI, will fundamentally change. 
 To decrease the immediate impact of 
these changes, May committed to a transitional 
period after the March 2019 Brexit date in 
which the UK and EU will adhere to current 
trade terms and remain partners in the single 
market and customs union for around two 
additional years (Stone). While this may 
delay the cliff-edge of Brexit and smooth 
the transition, it remains that the UK will 
ultimately depart both the single market and 
customs union. At the time of this writing, with 
the December 8, 2017, EU-UK joint agreement 
being the farthest-reaching progress in Brexit 
negotiations, the unity on the desired future 
state of the Irish border is overshadowed by 
the risks of extremely adverse economic effects 
that British sovereignty entails.
Northern Ireland–Republic of 
Ireland Trade Relations 
 NI sent 31% of its goods directly to the 
ROI in 2016 (55% of goods went to the EU as 
a whole). Conversely, a mere 2% of the ROI’s 
goods was exported to NI. Despite this small 
percentage going to NI, the ROI’s largest 
export destination is the UK at 13% of total 
goods. While NI may not be the end destination 
for goods that cross the Irish border from the 
south, more than £33 billion of goods in 2014 
alone made the trek over the divide headed 
toward the UK (Stennett). The UK as a whole 
is significant to the ROI in terms of trade, but 
the ROI has broader export destinations than 
its northern neighbor. Thus, the biggest threat 
from frictions to cross-border trade clearly 
falls on NI due to its heavy reliance on direct 
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trading links with the south, accounting for 
nearly a third of its export economy (“Brexit 
and UK-Irish Relations”). 
 Cross-border trade is the cornerstone 
of the NI-ROI economic relationship and is 
a primary driver of Brexit discussions. The 
fact remains that withdrawal from the single 
market and customs union means managing a 
land border on the island of Ireland. The real 
questions are, What will be the constitution 
and scope of the control systems enforced at the 
external frontier for goods? and How will they 
affect the economics of cross-border trade on 
the island (Dougan)? The analysis of proposed 
border solutions in this article focuses on the 
economic perspective of the physical frontier 
for goods.
Analysis of Proposed Border 
Solutions
 The planned system of border controls 
post-Brexit is outlined in the NI and the ROI 
position paper released by the UK government 
on August 16, 2017. Plans include but are not 
limited to
 •  Establishing a new UK-EU customs 
partnership and trade agreement
 •  Utilizing extensive technology tools to 
reduce frictions to trade and ease the 
burden of complying with customs 
procedures
 •  Exempting small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) from customs 
processes and establishing mutual 
recognition for trusted traders among 
larger enterprises
 •  Approving select roads as official 
customs crossing points
 •  Maintaining absolute regulatory 
equivalence in the agri-food sector with 
no border checks on these types of goods 
to stabilize the economic lifeblood of the 
island
While the details are left to future negotiations, 
the position paper lays out the UK’s desired 
means and end state. The critical assessment 
below highlights the considerable gap between 
what the position paper calls “flexible and 
imaginative solutions” and reality (“Northern 
Ireland…”).
Customs Partnership and Trade 
Agreement
 The most important of the UK’s proposed 
solutions is a new customs partnership and 
potential free trade agreement with the EU after 
removal from the single market and customs 
union. If this paramount goal is not met, EU-
UK trade relations would revert to World Trade 
Organization standards. Extreme barriers to 
trade—including border posts, tariffs, and 
duties—would once again become the norm, 
potentially tearing apart integrated cross-
border supply chains and trading networks, 
especially for products in the agri-food sector, 
where the average EU tariff is 22.5%. Coinciding 
with these frictions are serious security risks 
resulting from sophisticated smuggling by 
paramilitary networks and criminal gangs 
seizing opportunities to evade tariffs and using 
these funds to fuel their violent and aggressive 
tendencies. Additionally, new border posts 
could become direct targets for dissenting 
republican paramilitary groups looking to 
instill fear through bloodshed (Anderson). As 
evidenced by the violent history of the border, 
especially in the relatively recent times of the 
Troubles, re-erecting physical border posts 
threatens to unravel many decades of peace 
process work. Both the EU and UK would need 
to invest significant resources to manage and 
police this hardened border while the economic 
damage to the all-island economy, especially 
on a local scale, could be deep and widespread 
(Burke). 
 This scenario—failure to reach a free 
trade agreement or customs arrangement—
must be strongly avoided. The UK government 
has expressed that the ideal solution would 
involve “aligning our approach to the customs 
border” and treating goods essentially 
the same way they are today for customs 
purposes, thereby eliminating the need for any 
additional customs processes on the border. 
Maintaining seamless custom relations is high 
in priority but not without difficulties, as the 
UK admits its planned approach is the first of 
its kind and bears unparalleled challenges for 
implementation (“Northern Ireland…”).
 For instance, this new customs 
partnership would require that Britain mirror 
EU tariffs for goods arriving from third 
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countries, while also agreeing to maintain EU 
product standards. However, this goes directly 
against the Brexiteers’ strong imperatives for 
sovereignty in striking Britain’s own trade 
deals. The directives would only erase trade 
borders if they completely cover all areas of 
commerce (Taylor). Additionally, to maintain 
border security and regulatory consistency 
there would need to be absolute and robust 
traceability of all goods, from origin to 
endpoint, across all sectors.
Technology to Reduce Frictions 
 As outlined in its position paper, the 
UK plans to mix technology and reduced 
documentation requirements to create post-
Brexit customs control mechanisms. Elements 
of this technology-based approach include 
online pre-departure customs declarations by 
the trader, origin and destination traceability, 
and automatically registering vehicular 
border crossings through plate recognition 
cameras. These components would then be 
integrated into user-friendly and reliable 
software accessible on both sides of the border 
(Hayward et al.). While more streamlined than 
traditional border posts, there will still need 
to be occasional physical checks to ensure 
that any vehicles that raise red flags could be 
inspected. To avoid lengthy delays at these 
crossings, the UK and EU would need to jointly 
operate a single customs window where either 
entity’s customs representatives have the right 
to carry out physical checks on any vehicle.
 The divide between the US and Canada 
has been touted as an example of a successful 
technology implementation of border 
management, complete with a single window 
system and unified software for declarations. 
Deep cooperation and flexibility on both sides, 
such as eliminating differences in standards 
and regulations on trade goods, ease the 
hard border experience. However, reliance 
on technology alone is not enough and has 
its faults, including software implementation 
failures leading to border crossing delays and 
heavy resource expenditures to continually 
resolve system errors and technical issues 
as they arise. The US-Canada system could 
be useful as a model for the Irish border, 
but consideration should be given to the 
fact that new technology often introduces 
more problems than expected (Tannous and 
Hayward).
 Cracks exist in this plan to achieve an 
invisible border through technology. The 
costs of following online customs declaration 
procedures would hit SMEs hard, because 
SMEs are responsible for the majority of cross-
border trade. These companies, with already 
thin profit margins, could not afford the 
information technology resources and staff 
necessary for full compliance with rules and 
absolute traceability for all their traded goods. 
Therefore, even with intelligently implemented 
technologies for customs management, both 
physical border controls and exceptional effort 
from traders remain imperative to uphold 
the integrity of legitimate trade while also 
mitigating security risks (Hayward et al.).
Special Trader Exemptions
 To mitigate adverse impacts, Britain 
proposes special arrangements for SMEs 
and larger enterprises alike. SMEs include 
businesses with fewer than 250 employees. In 
2015, of the more than 5,000 NI businesses 
that shipped goods south to the ROI, 99.8% 
were SMEs, and SMEs accounted for 80% 
of the value of those exports (“Additional 
Data…”). SMEs are clearly the foundation 
of local economies and cross-border trade 
on the island. Most of these smaller traders 
are not individually significant enough to be 
categorized in international trade but rather 
trade largely in local markets. The UK plan 
includes special cross-border trade exemptions 
from all new customs processes for certified 
SMEs. Upon acceptance via an extensive 
application, these local traders could operate 
as seamlessly as they do today (“Northern 
Ireland…”).
 Conversely, larger enterprises with 
greater than 250 employees account for 20% 
of the value of NI to the ROI trade in goods. 
Businesses falling into this category could 
submit a similar application and be labeled 
trusted traders. Trusted traders could access 
simplified customs procedures and streamlined 
online customs declarations. In combination, 
these two proposed programs aim to further 
reduce the physical infrastructure needed at 
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the border (“Northern Ireland…”).
 The problems here lie with the 
administrative costs to the businesses for 
registration and application for these special 
exemption programs. Additionally, the burden 
on the government to manage the programs, 
including the vetting process, would be 
substantial. Risks exist too of sophisticated 
smuggling and sub-standard products leaking 
through open channels should small traders 
have zero physical barriers to cross-border 
trade. While the intention behind special 
exemptions is right—a softened border—the 
inherent costs and risks must be considered 
and mitigated by both the UK and the EU in the 
system’s detailed design and implementation, a 
step far from even beginning at the time of this 
writing. 
Approved Roads for  
Border Crossings 
 On average, more than 12,500 heavy goods 
vehicles and light vans cross the Irish border 
per day. The UK Department for Transport 
estimates that during 2015 over 7 million tons 
of total freight were shipped back and forth, 
with the largest portion from the agri-food 
industry. Of the various shipping routes, half 
are concentrated within the Newry-Dundalk 
corridor (“Additional Data…”). Designating 
specific approved border crossings, especially 
on heavily trafficked throughways like Newry-
Dundalk, would limit the number of physical 
border posts needed, as all goods trade would 
then be required to enter and exit through 
these defined chokepoints. 
 A system like this currently exists 
between Norway, not a member of the 
EU, and Sweden, an EU member state. A 
comprehensive EU-Norway trade agreement 
and customs partnership covers manufactured 
goods and some agri-food products. Goods 
cross over a limited number of approved roads 
where jointly operated customs posts check 
goods only once, using customs staff from 
either side. Thanks to electronic detection of 
plate numbers and online declarations, delays 
average only a few minutes. At the same time, 
comparing this Scandinavian border to the 
Irish border is unrealistic. The land border 
between Norway and Sweden contains only a 
few passable roads in sparsely populated areas. 
Ireland, on the contrary, has well over 200 roads 
crossing the border, dozens of which are small 
and may crisscross the border many times. 
It is in these intertwined borderlands where 
organized smuggling and criminal activity are 
most present, challenges that are foreign to the 
Norway-Sweden border (Matthews).
 A stark choice for the UK remains: establish 
a select group of approved roads with physical 
customs posts, which potentially become targets 
for violence from dissident paramilitary groups 
and back doors for increased smuggling, or 
allow traders to traverse all cross-border roads 
and face the high logistics costs of tracking 
and managing legitimate and illegitimate trade 
across these routes. Neither option at this 
point seems feasible. In developing a solution, 
the UK will again need to utilize “flexible and 
imaginative” methods in an “unprecedented” 
scenario, because for certain, straightforward 
approved roads are no easy answer (“Northern 
Ireland…”). 
Considerations for the  
Agri-food Sector 
 The agri-food sector dominates the 
cross-border trade economies on the island of 
Ireland. Supply chains for farming, livestock, 
food, and beverage production are deeply 
integrated, flowing back and forth across the 
border and accounting for 56% of cross-border 
trade on the island in total. Reliance on exports 
in these lifeblood industries is above average. 
For example, 42% of dairy sales are exports, 
37% with sheep, 39% with fish, and 44% with 
drinks. Additionally, in the flow of a product’s 
life, production and processing can occur on 
differing sides of the border; for instance, 27% 
of the milk from NI’s farms (nearly 600 million 
liters) is processed in the ROI (“Additional 
Data…”). Furthermore, due to extreme health 
risks from sub-standard agri-food products, 
regulations on this sector are strict and 
require extensive physical quality inspections. 
The current EU standards that apply to agri-
food imports from any non-EU nation require 
official physical inspection on departure and 
entry into the EU via certified border inspection 
posts as well as manual documentation and 
identity checks 100% of the time. The sudden 
83
shock of a transition from today’s seamless 
agri-food trade and supply chains over the 
border to this new system of hardened delays 
and extensive checks potentially could plunge 
small agricultural businesses into an economic 
downward spiral (Matthews). 
 The only effective method to sustain 
the regulatory-sensitive agri-food sector is to 
ensure that UK products continue to comply 
with EU single market regulations (Hayward 
and Campbell). This frictionless end-state is 
entirely contingent on the post-Brexit customs 
partnership and trade agreement. British 
officials stress that from day one after Brexit, 
thanks to the Great Repeal Bill, UK and EU 
regulations will be identical. This commitment 
requires substantial compromise by hardline 
Brexiteers, as the UK would have to follow 
EU regulations in the future even as adapted 
and changed, in turn limiting their ability to 
enter free trade agreements with any third 
countries demanding access into UK markets 
for food products incompatible with EU rules 
(Matthews). Regardless of the approach, 
the agri-food sector is a top priority to be 
protected, for the alternative is widespread 
economic suffering of the people relying on 
these integrated trade networks. 
Conclusion
 Every parameter of the UK’s strategy 
for border solutions poses a difficult balance 
between sovereignty and all-island economic 
stability. For Brexit negotiators, there is 
no perfect design. Simply following the 
models of non-member countries currently 
in partnership with the EU is not a cut-and-
dried option, due to the especially intertwined 
social, political, cultural, and economic ties 
on the island of Ireland. Rather, an innovative 
approach is necessary, which creatively 
amalgamates components from successful 
border models tailored to the unique needs of 
the UK, NI, the EU, and the ROI altogether. 
Lessons from the contentious history of 
the Irish border, from its partition to the 
smuggling and violence of the Troubles, must 
be combined with a forward-looking approach 
to ensure the all-island economy can continue 
to grow and flourish while minimizing any 
regression in the peace process. The two-year 
transitional period beyond the March 2019 
Brexit date gives bureaucrats and negotiators 
from both sides a much needed time buffer to 
arrive at a comprehensive solution for future 
cross-border trade. Perhaps the greatest 
takeaway from this analysis of the story of 
the Irish border and the quest for seamless 
trade is that freedom from EU membership 
does not alter the timeless tools that support 
truly frictionless trade relations: regulatory 
commonality, deeply coordinated efforts, and 
cooperation through compromise.
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